Research
Journal Articles
"Freedom First: On Coercion and Coercive Offers," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming)
The dominant theories of coercion and coercive offers today are moralized, in the sense that they explain the prima facie wrongfulness of coercive incentivization on the basis that such incentivization essentially involves some other, independent wrong, such as a conditional proposal to violate another's rights. I develop and defend a new version of a more old‐school theory, according to which coercive incentivization is prima facie wrong fundamentally because it threatens another's freedom. Coercion and coercive offers, I argue, are essentially exercises of power over another person for the purpose of steering that person's practical reasoning. This power‐dependent way of trying to steer another's practical reasoning threatens the other's freedom, thereby violates a general prima facie duty of respect, and is prima facie wrong for that reason. I conclude by arguing that there may be a moral presumption not only against coercive incentivization but against incentivization in general. [Early-view version (open access)]
"The Difficulty of Making Good Work Available to All," Journal of Applied Philosophy (2024)
How might good work—skilled, autonomous work that affords workers opportunities for meaningful social cooperation in decent conditions—be made available to all? I evaluate five commonly advanced strategies: an unregulated labor market, egalitarian redistribution of resources, state regulation, collective bargaining, and workplace democracy. Each, I argue, has significant limitations. An unregulated labor market ignores workers' unduly weak bargaining power vis-à-vis employers. Egalitarian redistribution alone fails to solve this problem due to distinctive and endemic imperfections of labor markets. Direct state regulation is insufficiently context-sensitive and insufficiently dynamic in the face of technological and other developments. Collective bargaining gives workers only indirect and sometimes costly influence over their working conditions. And workplace democracy leaves workers vulnerable to collective action problems induced by competition between firms. I argue, however, that these strategies can be complemented in a promising way by "syndicalist economic democracy": direct worker participation in the government of the economy, largely specific to particular occupations or economic sectors but above the level of the individual workplace. [Published version (open access)]
"The Unity of Marx's Concept of Alienated Labor," The Philosophical Review (2024)
Marx says of alienated labor that it does not "belong" to the worker, that it issues in a product that does not belong to her, and that it is unfulfilling, unfree, egoistically motivated, and inhuman. He seems to think, moreover, that the first of these features grounds all the others. All of these features seem quite independent, however: they can come apart; they share no obvious common cause or explanation; and if they often occur together, this seems accidental. It is not clear, then, how Marx’s concept of alienated labor could possess the strong unity that he takes it to have. This article defends a reinterpretation of the concept that explains this unity. The various features of alienated labor, the article argues, all follow from a single, hitherto underappreciated feature of its formal motivational structure: the fact that such labor is motivated not by its product but by an incentive. [Published version (paywalled); postprint (open access)]
"Freedom, Desire, and Necessity: Autonomous Activity as Activity for Its Own Sake," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2023)
I defend a necessary condition of local autonomy inspired by Aristotle and Marx. One does something autonomously, I argue, only if one does it for its own sake and not for the sake of further ends alone. I show that this idea steers an attractive middle path between the subjectivism of Dworkin- and Frankfurt-style theories of autonomy on the one hand and the objectivism of Raz-style theories on the other. By doing so, it vindicates and explains two important pieces of common sense of which those theories struggle to make sense. First, it explains how external sources of compulsion, such as coercion by other people and duress by unfavorable circumstances, can compromise the autonomy of an activity. Second, it explains this by articulating the sense in which to act autonomously is to do what one really or truly wants to do, and the correlative sense in which to do something unfreely is instead to be forced or necessitated to do it. At the same time, my proposal brings into view distinctive species of external unfreedom beyond the traditional paradigm cases of coercion and duress. Most importantly, it implies that toil—labor which is not valued intrinsically but is done purely on account of its instrumental necessity—is essentially unfree. [Early-view version (open access)]
The dominant theories of coercion and coercive offers today are moralized, in the sense that they explain the prima facie wrongfulness of coercive incentivization on the basis that such incentivization essentially involves some other, independent wrong, such as a conditional proposal to violate another's rights. I develop and defend a new version of a more old‐school theory, according to which coercive incentivization is prima facie wrong fundamentally because it threatens another's freedom. Coercion and coercive offers, I argue, are essentially exercises of power over another person for the purpose of steering that person's practical reasoning. This power‐dependent way of trying to steer another's practical reasoning threatens the other's freedom, thereby violates a general prima facie duty of respect, and is prima facie wrong for that reason. I conclude by arguing that there may be a moral presumption not only against coercive incentivization but against incentivization in general. [Early-view version (open access)]
"The Difficulty of Making Good Work Available to All," Journal of Applied Philosophy (2024)
How might good work—skilled, autonomous work that affords workers opportunities for meaningful social cooperation in decent conditions—be made available to all? I evaluate five commonly advanced strategies: an unregulated labor market, egalitarian redistribution of resources, state regulation, collective bargaining, and workplace democracy. Each, I argue, has significant limitations. An unregulated labor market ignores workers' unduly weak bargaining power vis-à-vis employers. Egalitarian redistribution alone fails to solve this problem due to distinctive and endemic imperfections of labor markets. Direct state regulation is insufficiently context-sensitive and insufficiently dynamic in the face of technological and other developments. Collective bargaining gives workers only indirect and sometimes costly influence over their working conditions. And workplace democracy leaves workers vulnerable to collective action problems induced by competition between firms. I argue, however, that these strategies can be complemented in a promising way by "syndicalist economic democracy": direct worker participation in the government of the economy, largely specific to particular occupations or economic sectors but above the level of the individual workplace. [Published version (open access)]
"The Unity of Marx's Concept of Alienated Labor," The Philosophical Review (2024)
Marx says of alienated labor that it does not "belong" to the worker, that it issues in a product that does not belong to her, and that it is unfulfilling, unfree, egoistically motivated, and inhuman. He seems to think, moreover, that the first of these features grounds all the others. All of these features seem quite independent, however: they can come apart; they share no obvious common cause or explanation; and if they often occur together, this seems accidental. It is not clear, then, how Marx’s concept of alienated labor could possess the strong unity that he takes it to have. This article defends a reinterpretation of the concept that explains this unity. The various features of alienated labor, the article argues, all follow from a single, hitherto underappreciated feature of its formal motivational structure: the fact that such labor is motivated not by its product but by an incentive. [Published version (paywalled); postprint (open access)]
"Freedom, Desire, and Necessity: Autonomous Activity as Activity for Its Own Sake," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2023)
I defend a necessary condition of local autonomy inspired by Aristotle and Marx. One does something autonomously, I argue, only if one does it for its own sake and not for the sake of further ends alone. I show that this idea steers an attractive middle path between the subjectivism of Dworkin- and Frankfurt-style theories of autonomy on the one hand and the objectivism of Raz-style theories on the other. By doing so, it vindicates and explains two important pieces of common sense of which those theories struggle to make sense. First, it explains how external sources of compulsion, such as coercion by other people and duress by unfavorable circumstances, can compromise the autonomy of an activity. Second, it explains this by articulating the sense in which to act autonomously is to do what one really or truly wants to do, and the correlative sense in which to do something unfreely is instead to be forced or necessitated to do it. At the same time, my proposal brings into view distinctive species of external unfreedom beyond the traditional paradigm cases of coercion and duress. Most importantly, it implies that toil—labor which is not valued intrinsically but is done purely on account of its instrumental necessity—is essentially unfree. [Early-view version (open access)]
Book Review
"Marx's Ethical Vision by Vanessa Christina Wills," European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
[Early-view version (paywalled); postprint available on request]
[Early-view version (paywalled); postprint available on request]